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Abstract 
This paper describes and decomposes wage differences between female and male 
workers. The results indicate that females receive low wages because of unequal pay 
within sectors, and that the wage gap caused by the difference in sectoral attainment is 
small. The results also reveal that a lion’s share of the wage differential between 
females and males is attributable to discrimination rather than to the human capital 
difference between the genders. Eliminating discriminations against females with a 
focus on intra-sectoral inequality is crucial for reducing female/male wage differentials. 
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During the pre-reform period, the state-owned and collective-owned enterprises, which 
dominated the Chinese economy, had no autonomy in hiring or firing workers. All 
working-aged urbanites, both men and women, were entitled to, and provided with, a 
job assigned by the government’s department of labour. Under this system, the target of 
employment policies was to guarantee full employment with very low and relatively 
equal wage rates. Lacking operative autonomy and responsibility, enterprises had no 
rights in deciding wage rates or wage increases on the one hand, and had no incentive, 
on the other hand, to do so (Lin, Cai and Li 2001). During the entire period of 1950s to 
the late 1970s, the average wage rate level of Chinese workers had not changed much, 
nor did it reflect the differences in workers’ individual characteristics and work efforts. 
The economic reform that began in the late 1970s has continually granted more 
autonomy to the state-owned and collective-owned enterprises, inducing market-like 
behaviour. Furthermore, non-state and private enterprises have been rapidly expanding 
and have become dominant players in market competition since the late 1990s. With the 
structural change in ownership, market forces increasingly play a role in allocating 
resources. As the result of this privatization and marketization, an increasingly enhanced 
share of the labourforce is allocated through labour markets instead of administrative 
distribution. In the same process, an increased wage gap between female and male 
workers has been observed in urban labour markets (Gustafsson and Li 2000; Maurer-
Fazio, Rawski and Zhang 1999). The explanations on the widening income gap between 
genders may differ. 
One possible explanation is that as labour markets develop, the returns to human capital 
increase and the differences in educational attainment and work skills between female 
and male workers become reflected in wage differentials. Some studies find that a rapid 
increase of returns to education in labour markets occurs during the economic transition 
(for example, Lai 1999; Li, Zhao and Zhang 1999). If women’s educational attainments 
are significantly lower than men’s, a systematic wage differential between genders 
exists as long as the labour markets work. According to the national census conducted 
in 2000, women have on average 1.1 years of less schooling than men in the country as 
a whole, while the gap is 0.93 years in urban areas. Gustafsson and Li (2000) suggest 
that the most important source of the increase in the explained wage difference is 
education, although discrimination is also a factor. Another study (Mason, Rozelle and 
Zhang 2000) finds that the unexplained part of the observed wage gap between genders 
in the rural areas has been constant, but its comparative importance declined in the 
period of 1988 to 1995. 
Another possible explanation is enterprise behaviour under the market environment. 
That is, now that enterprises are motivated to maximize profits and have the autonomy 
of hiring and deciding compensation, they value, for whatever reason, female workers 
less than male workers, and thus hire fewer women or/and pay them less. If the 
differences in education and other individual characteristics cannot explain the entire 
wage differential between females and males, discrimination is present in the labour 
market. Existing literature suggests that human capital is not the only factor explaining 
the earnings gap between genders. Given the fact that enterprises have achieved profit 
motivation and managerial autonomy, if the labour market has not matured to the stage 
so as to evaluate accurately workers’ human capital, gender may become a ‘signal’ of 
pre-assuming workers’ performance, which is similar to the ‘sheepskin effect in the  
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returns to education’ (Hungerford and Solon 1987). During the reform process, state-
owned enterprises still behave differently from their non-state counterparts, which 
§operate in environment with a closer resemblance to a competitive labour market. 
Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (1999) find significant difference in gender earnings 
deviations between state and non-state sectors. According to one study (Liu, Meng and 
Zhang 2000), the earnings gap that can be explained by discrimination declines in the 
transition from the state-owned, or collectively owned enterprises to private enterprises. 
Meng (1998) finds that the gender earnings differentials are attributable in full to 
discrimination for those employees whose jobs were assigned by local governments, 
while only two-thirds can be attributed to discrimination on the part of workers who 
obtained jobs through individual job-hunting efforts. 
In fact, the current gender earnings gap existing in the urban labour markets is due to 
both contributions of human capital difference and pure discrimination factor. For 
examining the topic of gender earnings differentials, several questions need to be 
answered. First, we need to explore the extent to which labour market discrimination 
contributes to the gender gap in earnings. Second, in cases where discrimination is 
present, we need to determine whether it is generated in the selection process, or in the 
form of pay difference. Third, other attributes of gender earnings differentials in 
addition to the discrimination factor need to be identified. This paper intends to answer 
these questions empirically.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we utilize both macro and 
micro data to illustrate the sectoral and occupational distribution and differences in 
educational attainments between female and male workers. Sections 3 employs the 
decomposition method to estimate the components of gender wage differentials, 
revealing the relative contribution of each factor to overall differentials in gender 
earnings. Section 4 concludes with some policy implications. 
2  Employment and human capital difference 
In the following section, we utilize data from the China Urban Labour Survey (CULS) 
to analyse gender wage differentials between sectors. CULS was conducted in five 
cities: Fuzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, Wuhan, and Xian at year-end 2001 by the Institute 
of Population and Labour Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(IPS-CASS). In each city, all labourers aged over 16 years old in 700 local households 
and 600 individual migrant workers were interviewed, respectively. 
We analyse the sectoral distribution and wages of females and males aged 16-60 years. 
Based on the average wage levels by sector in 2001 given in the National Bureau of 
Statistics’ China Statistical Yearbook 2002 (NBS), we rank the average wages of 16 
sectors in ascending order into four groups.1 The first group of sectors includes farming, 
forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, mining and quarrying, construction and 
wholesale and retail trade and catering services. The second category includes sectors 
such as manufacturing, geological prospecting, water conservancy, education, culture 
                                                 
1  Some may consider that this categorization method based on the average wage of sectors to be too 
simple. Research is being done to obtain indicators that would better reflect the monopoly and entry 
barriers among sectors. However, there are no convincing results yet.  
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and arts, radio, film and television and social services. The third group covers 
government agencies, party agencies and social organizations, health care, sports and 
social welfare, real estate trade and other sectors. The fourth group encompasses such 
sectors as transport, storage, post and telecommunication services, production and 
supply of electricity, gas and water, finance and insurance and scientific research and 
polytechnic services. The average wage level rises from the first to the fourth group of 
sectors, implying a successively increasing monopoly and entry barriers among the 
sectors. 
Based on CULS data, Table 1 gives the sectoral distribution and hourly wages for 
females and males aged 16-60 in the five cities under review. The differences in sectoral 
distribution between females and males are quite noticeable. In the first, second and 
third groups, women are better represented than men, whereas in the fourth group, the 
proportion of females is lower. This indicates that it is easier for men to enter sectors 
with a high monopoly and entry barriers. As is shown in Table 1, the differences in 
hourly wages between females and males are not only very large, but exist widely in all 
sectors. There are also differences between males and females in human capital 
endowments and individual characteristics. As Table 2 indicates, men have an 
advantage over women in all human capital indicators such as years of schooling, job  
 
Table 1 
Sectoral distribution and hourly wages for females and males 
  Sectoral distribution    Hourly wage by sector (yuan) 
 Females  Males    Females  Males 
Workers  in:  Freq.  %  Freq. %   Mean SD Mean SD 
1st sector group 
(farming, forestry, animal 
husbandry & fishery, mining & 
quarrying, construction & wholesale 
retail trade & catering services) 
402 24.72  472 21.95 4.88 7.98 5.82 8.63 
2nd sector group 
(manufacturing, geological 
prospecting, water conservancy, 
education, culture and arts, radio, 
film & television and social 
services) 
711 43.73  868 40.37 4.58 5.32 5.63 4.49 
3rd sector group 
(government agencies, party 
agencies and social organizations, 
health care, sports & social welfare, 
real estate trade and other sectors) 
281 17.28  299 13.91 5.38 3.71 6.86 4.24 
4th sector group 
(transport, storage, post & 
telecommunication services, 
production/ supply of electricity, gas 
& water, finance & insurance; 
scientific research & polytechnic 
services) 
232 14.27  511 23.77 6.14 5.85 7.31 7.20 
Total 1626  100.00  2150 100.00 5.01 5.96 6.24 6.29 
Source:   Calculated from China Urban Labour Survey.  
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experience, communist party membership and health status. Compared to women, men 
have more schooling (0.12 years), more other job experience (0.06 years) and more total 
job experience (3.04 years). The proportion of males with party membership is 24.98 
per cent, which is higher than that of females. Good health status is reported by 57.4 per 
cent of the males, which is higher than reported for females. There are also other 
differences in individual characteristics between females and males. The proportion of 
females with training is higher than for males, while 82.4 per cent of the females have 
spouses, which is lower than the proportion of males. 
Table 2 
Summary statistics of human capital and individual characteristics for females and males 
  Female Male   
Continuous variables  Mean SD Mean SD  Difference in mean 
Years of schooling  11.67 2.76  11.78 3.00  0.12 
Other job experience  4.84 7.69 4.90 7.19  0.06 
Total job experience  18.88 9.91  21.92 10.14  3.04 
Discrete variables  %  %  Difference in % 
Party membership  14.39  24.98  -10.59 
Good health status  51.42  57.41  5.99 
Normal health status  41.01  37.00  -4.01 
Poor health status  7.57  5.59  -1.98 
Training 14.94  12.09  -2.85 
Married 82.40  83.95  1.55 
Source:   Calculated from China Urban Labour Survey. 
Table 3 
Occupational distribution and years of schooling for females and males 
  White-collar workers    Blue-collar workers 
  Proportion  Yrs of schooling   Proportion  Yrs of schooling 
 China 
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Notes:   Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source:   Calculated from 0.95‰ sampling data of population census in 2000.  
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We now analyse the occupational distribution difference between females and males 
using 0.95‰ sampling data of the population census in 2000. We define white-collar 
workers as those who are staff of government and party agencies; managers of 
enterprises and social organizations; professional and technical staff, and junior office 
staff. Blue-collar workers constitute workers in the trades and services; labourers in 
farming, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and water conservancy: workers handling 
production and transportation equipment, and ‘others’. 
As can be seen from Table 3, huge differences exist between females and males in the 
occupational distribution and years of schooling. This is consistent with our findings 
from CULS. The share of female workers engaged in white-collar job is lower than 
males while the proportions of female blue-collar workers are higher regardless of 
whether China is considered as a whole, or broken down to urban areas or rural areas. Z 
test shows that all the differences in proportions are statistically significant. On the other 
hand, female white-collar workers have more years of schooling than males, while 
female blue-collar workers have less schooling. And the t test indicates that all the 
differences are also very significant. 
We also analyse the sectoral distribution difference between females and males using 
0.95‰ sampling data of the population census in 2000. Based on the average wage 
levels in 2001 by sector reported in the China Statistical Yearbook 2002 (NSB 2002), 
we rank the average wages of 16 sectors in ascending order into low-wage sectors and 
high-wage sectors. 
Table 4 
Sectoral distribution and years of schooling for females and males 
  Low-wage sectors     High-wage sectors 
  Proportion  Yrs of schooling   Proportion  Yrs of schooling
 China 
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Notes:   Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source:   Calculated from 0.95‰ sampling data of the population census in 2000.  
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We find huge differences in the sectoral distribution and years of schooling between 
females and males in Table 4. In both urban and rural areas, the proportion of females 
engaged in low-wage sectors and the proportion of males in high-wage sectors are 
higher than their counterparts with statistical significance, respectively. Female workers 
in high-wage sectors have more years of schooling than males. Female workers in low-
wage sectors have less years of schooling. The t test indicates that all the differences are 
also very significant. 
Difference in human capital is undoubtedly one of the factors that causes gaps between 
females and males in sectoral attainment and earnings. If the wage differentials between 
females and males can be explained perfectly by individual endowment differences, 
there is no systematic discrimination against females in the labour market. From the 
above analysis we can see that the human capital of females is lower in some 
occupations and sectors and higher in others, but in all cases female wages are lower 
than that of males. The next section examines this issue to determine if discrimination 
against females exists in China’s urban labour market. 
3  Wage discrimination against female workers 
Discrimination against females has been present in many aspects for long time due to 
historical and social factors. In labour economics, human capital endowments and other 
personal characteristics of workers are decisive in determining employment 
opportunities and levels of earning. Only the unexplained component of existing 
differences in work and pay can be considered to be the result of labour market 
discrimination (Becker 1957). Wage discrimination refers to wage differentials caused 
solely by gender, race or household registration address after controlling for the 
individual’s productivity-related characteristics. To what extent does the gap in human 
capital cause the sectoral attainment and wage differences between females and males in 
China’s urban labour market? Are there other institutional or unexplainable factors? To 
what extent are the wage differences caused by inter-sectoral or intra-sectoral wage 
differentials?  
Most studies on this topic focus either on comparing the differences in female wage 
discrimination between firm ownerships, or on analysing the relationship between wage 
discrimination and the degree of marketization. There is, however, a host of literature 
showing that sectoral wage difference is an important component of the overall wage 
gap. For example, after controlling for such factors as education, ability, trade union 
activeness, short-term labour demand, and job hazard, all of which vary across sectors, 
significant wage differentials are still found among sectors (Katz 1986). Other research 
suggests that even in countries with advanced labour markets, sectoral wage 
differentials exist (Krueger and Summers 1988; Dickens and Katz 1987). 
We utilize the CULS data to decompose the wage differentials between females and 
males by adopting the method developed by Brown, Moon and Zoloth (1980). The 
wage decomposition proposed by these authors can be expressed by the equation:  
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hypothetical proportion of females who would have been in sector j if they followed the 
same sectoral distribution as males do. 
3.1  Estimation of sectoral attainment 
To apply the above method, we first need to utilize a multinomial logit model2 to 
estimate the impact of sectoral attainment separately for the two groups. A reduced form 
of the multinomial logit model is specified to capture how certain variables influencing 
sectoral attainments affect the probability (Pij) of individual i working in sector j. This 
model is given as: 
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where N is the sample size, J is the number of sectoral groups, and xi, is a vector of 
exogenous variables affecting sectoral attainments.  
The estimation of the multinomial logit model requires a choice of a reference group, 
whose coefficient is normalized to 0. Therefore, coefficients from other groups should 
be compared to the reference group. A positive coefficient means that the variable has a 
positive effect on the relative probability of being in that sector as compared to the 
reference group. In contrast, a negative coefficient means that the variable has a 
negative effect on the relative probability of being in that sector as compared to the 
reference group. 
We have four groups of sectors. The first group is taken to be the reference group. The 
independent variables included in the sectoral attainment model are years of schooling, 
other job experience, other job experience squared, a dummy variable for party 
membership (non-party member as the reference group), a dummy variable for training 
(no training as the reference group), a dummy variable for marital status (no spouse as 
the reference group), a group of dummy variables for health status (poor health status as 
the reference group), family size and a group of dummy variables for four cities 
                                                 
2  We use a multinomial logit model rather than ordered probit model because there is no obvious 
hierarchical order among the sectors.  
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(Shanghai as the reference group). The separate estimation results for females and males 
are reported in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Multinomial logit results of sectoral attainment model 
 Females  Males 
  Coefficient Standard  error  Coefficient Standard  error 
  Workers in the second group of sectors 
Years of schooling  0.0910*** 0.0259  0.0370*  0.0221 
Other job experience  -0.0349 0.0234  -0.0394  0.0240 
Other job experience squared 0.0008  0.0008  0.0006 0.0009 
Dummy for Party member  0.4285**  0.2147  0.1861  0.1532 
Dummy for training  0.1627  0.2081  0.0248  0.2077 
Dummy for married  0.5100***  0.1776  0.5310***  0.1704 
Dummy for good health status  -0.4104* 0.2480  0.6092** 0.2443 
Dummy for normal health status -0.3597  0.2492  0.8981***  0.2488 
Family size  -0.1171*  0.0656  -0.0140  0.0649 
Dummy for Wuhan  0.2611  0.2028  -0.2970  0.1905 
Dummy for Shenyang  0.1138  0.2280  -0.5427***  0.2013 
Dummy for Fuzhou  0.0488  0.1927  -0.6338***  0.1861 
Dummy for Xian  0.3311*  0.2007  -0.3676**  0.1875 
Constant -0.2567  0.4600 -0.4261 0.4433 
  Workers in the third group of sectors 
Years of schooling  0.1403*** 0.0334  0.1169***  0.0285 
Other job experience  0.0117 0.0302  0.0179  0.0312 
Other job experience squared  -0.0004 0.0011  -0.0003  0.0012 
Dummy for Party member  0.8003***  0.2423  0.6766***  0.1854 
Dummy for training  0.4422*  0.2394  0.3657  0.2390 
Dummy for married  0.2557  0.2201  0.1325  0.2178 
Dummy for good health status  -0.1988 0.3318  0.6987**  0.3335 
Dummy for normal health status 0.0044  0.3308  0.6225*  0.3429 
Family size  -0.1075  0.0846  -0.1156  0.0891 
Dummy for Wuhan  -0.2150  0.2512  -0.4226*  0.2517 
Dummy for Shenyang  0.1980  0.2624  -0.3865  0.2589 
Dummy for Fuzhou  -0.2348  0.2330  -0.1398  0.2292 
Dummy for Xian  -0.7103***  0.2729  -0.8399***  0.2581 
Constant -1.7951***  0.5964 -2.2019***  0.5941 
  Workers in the fourth group of sectors 
Years of schooling  0.1474*** 0.0359  0.0428*  0.0247 
Other job experience  -0.0266 0.0399  -0.0081  0.0283 
Other job experience squared  -0.0007 0.0017  -0.0008  0.0012 
Dummy for Party member  -0.0598  0.2979  -0.0243  0.1738 
Dummy for training  0.4465*  0.2513  0.5645***  0.2114 
Dummy for married  0.5201**  0.2347  0.1694  0.1809 
Dummy for good health status  0.8588* 0.4467  0.6043** 0.2794 
Dummy for normal health status 0.5651  0.4521  0.6258**  0.2863 
Family size  -0.0874  0.0868  -0.0342  0.0725 
Dummy for Wuhan  0.8051***  0.2687  0.0580  0.2088 
Dummy for Shenyang  0.3843  0.3066  -0.3513  0.2259 
Dummy for Fuzhou  -0.1861  0.2901  -0.3541*  0.2070 
Dummy for Xian  0.1820  0.2863  -0.4401**  0.2152 
Constant -3.3127***  0.7077 -0.7771 0.4971 
Log likelihood  -1945.7954  -2633.6301 
P rob>chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R
2 0.0407  0.0303 
Observations 1583  2067 
Notes:   The first group of sectors is taken to the reference group; 
  ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels, respectively.  
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The multinomial logit sectoral attainment model is estimated for females and males, 
respectively. We conduct F-test and find that there is a statistically significant difference 
between females and males in the equations explaining sectoral attainment. From the 
estimation, education has very similar effects for females and males. It increases the 
probability of entering the second, third and fourth sector groups for both females and 
males, in comparison to entering the first group of sectors. Females with party 
membership are more likely to enter the second and third sector groups, while males 
who are party members are more likely to enter the third group. The role of training in 
sectoral attainment is very similar for both genders: training increases the probability for 
females of entering the third and fourth sector groups, while for males it also increases 
the probability of entering the fourth group. Females who have spouses are more likely 
to enter the second and fourth sectoral groups, and males with spouses are also more 
likely to enter the second group. Males with good or normal health status are more 
likely to enter the second, third and fourth groups, compared to males with poor health 
status. Females with larger family size are less likely to enter the second group. 
3.2  Sectoral distributions: actual and predicted 
The structural difference in sectoral attainment between females and males seemingly 
indicates that they are treated differently in urban labour markets. We predict the 
sectoral distribution for females by using the estimated parameters of the sectoral 
attainment model for males. This prediction reveals what the sectoral distribution of 
females would have been if they were treated similarly to males. The difference 
between actual and predicted sectoral distributions indicates the degree of different 
treatment in favour of males or against females. We also predict the sectoral distribution 
for males using the estimated parameters of the sectoral attainment model for females to 
reveal what the sectoral distribution of males would have been if they were treated 
similarly to females. Table 6 reports the actual and predicted sectoral distribution for the 
two groups of workers. 
The results reported in Table 6 show that if females had received equal treatment with 
males, the proportion of being in the first, second and third groups would have 
decreased by 2.32 per cent, 3.88 per cent and 4.27 per cent, respectively, and the 
proportion of females in the fourth group would have increased by more than 10 per 
cent. In contrast, if males had been treated similarly to females, the male shares of being 
 
Table 6 
Actual and predicted sectoral distributions for females and males (%) 
  Actual (1)  Predicted (2)  Difference (2) minus (1) 
Workers in:  Females 
1st group of sectors 24.95  22.63  -2.32 
2nd group of sectors 44.28  40.40  -3.88 
3rd group of sectors 16.99  12.72  -4.27 
4th group of sectors 13.77  24.25  10.48 
  Males 
1st group of sectors 22.01  24.37  2.36 
2nd group of sectors 40.49  44.14 3.64 
3rd group of sectors 13.84  17.84  4.00 
4th group of sectors 23.66  13.65  -10.01  
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in the first, second and third groups would have increased by 2.36 per cent, 3.64 per 
cent and 4.00 per cent, respectively and male representation in the fourth sector would 
have decreased by more than 10 per cent. 
3.3  Estimation of wage equation  
In order to determine the components of discrimination in the overall wage differentials 
between the genders, we need to estimate wage equations for females and males, 
respectively. The decomposition procedure requires us to estimate wage equations for 
females and males within each sector. The wage equation is specified as: 
ε β β β β β β β β β β β α + + + + + + + + + + + + = u o c f h m t p y y e inc 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4
2
3 2 1 ) log(
   (3) 
where inc is hourly wage, e is years of schooling, y is total job experience, y
2 is total job 
experience squared, p is a dummy variable for party membership (non-party 
membership as the reference group), t is a dummy variable for training (no training as 
the reference group), m is a dummy variable for marital status (no spouse as the 
reference group), h is a group of dummy variables for health status (poor health status as 
the reference group), f is family size, c is a group of dummy variables for occupations 
(self-employed workers as the reference group); o is a group of dummy variables for 
ownerships (government and party agencies and institutions as the reference group); u is 
a group of dummy variables for four cities (Shanghai as the reference group), ε is the 
error term. The wage equation estimation results are reported in Table 7.  
Most coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant, and the R
2 
values are reasonable in the equations of both females and males.3 As is shown in 
Table 7, education has a significantly positive effect on wage determination for both 
genders in almost all sectors. The rate of return to education is higher for females than 
males: in all four sector groups, the rates of return to education are above 6 per cent, 
compared to less than 6 per cent for males, except for the third group. The variable of 
total job experience, as another proxy for human capital, has no significant effect on the 
wage determination of either gender in almost all groups of sectors. The dummy 
variable for party membership is positively related to wages for females in the first 
group and for males in the third group. The dummy variable for training is positively 
related to female wages in the first and second groups and for males in the second 
group. Good health status has positive effects on female wages in the first and third 
groups and on male wages in the first and second groups. Normal health status has 
positive and significant effects on the wages of men in the first and second groups. The 
city dummy variables affect negatively and significantly wages for both genders in each 
group of sectors. We do not discuss other controlling variables in detail here. 
 
 
                                                 
3   We also estimate the pooled regression of females and males for each sector. The results show that the 
dummy variable for female is significantly negative. For simplicity, we do not present the results here.  
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Table 7 
OLS estimation of hourly wage equations for females and males 
  Workers in the different sector groups 
  1st group  2nd group  3rd group  4th group 
 FEMALES 

































































































































































      
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
R
2  0.4370 0.3602 0.3018  0.4324 
Observations 371  665  253  209 
      Table  7  con’t 
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Table 7 (con’t) 
OLS estimation of hourly wage equations for females and males 
  Workers in the different sector groups 
  1st group  2nd group  3rd group  4th group 
 MALES 

































































































































































       
Prob>F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R
2 0.3157  0.3734  0.4887  0.4078 
Observations 433  810  268  470 
Notes:  ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels, respectively. 
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3.4  Decomposition of wage differentials 
To decompose the wage differentials, we need to calculate the means of all independent 
variables for females and males in each sector group. In Equation (1), the first term 
measures the within-sectoral wage differential due to the difference in the mean values 
of individual endowments between the two sexes. The second term represents the 
within-sectoral wage differential due to the difference in the wage equation coefficients 
estimated for females and males in each sector group. The third term captures the 
portion of the wage gap explained by differences in the sectoral distribution caused by 
variances in female and male endowments. The fourth term indicates the portion of the 
wage gap due to unexplained differences in sectoral distributions between females and 
males. 
Table 8 gives the decomposition results. The differential of mean log hourly wages 
between females and males is 0.24. Of this, 0.2234 or 93.1 per cent is attributed to 
within-sectoral wage differentials, while 0.0165 or 6.9 per cent is attributable to wage 
differentials caused by sectoral distribution differences. In China’s urban labour market, 
the wage differentials between females and males are mainly caused by within-sectoral 
wage differentials. 
Of the 0.2234 within-sectoral wage differential, the contribution of individual 
endowment is 0.0149 or 6.19 per cent and the unexplained portion remains 0.2086 or 
86.91 per cent. Of the 0.0165 inter-sectoral wage differential, the contribution of 
individual endowment is 0.0018 or 0.76 per cent and the unexplained portion is 0.0147 
or 6.14 per cent. Overall, 6.95 per cent of the total urban wage differential between 
females and males can be attributed to differences in individual endowment and the 
unexplained portion is 93.05 per cent, which may be attributed mainly to discrimination 
favouring males. 
Table 8 
Decomposition results of wage differentials between females and males 
  Log hourly wage  % of total  % of intra-sectoral  % of inter-sectoral
Total wage differential  0.2400  100.00     
Intra-sectoral 0.2234  93.10  100.00   
Explained 0.0149  6.19  6.65   
Unexplained 0.2086  86.91  93.35   
Inter-sectoral 0.0165  6.90   100.00 
Explained 0.0018  0.76   11.01 
Unexplained 0.0147  6.14   88.99 
Total explained  0.0167  6.95     
Total unexplained  0.2233  93.05     
 
4  Conclusion and policy implications 
While confirming the significant existence of earning differentials between genders, the 
decomposition results suggest that the gap is overwhelmingly generated within sectors. 
Within a sector, 93.35 per cent of the wage differentials cannot be explained by human 
capital and other individual characteristics, and therefore can be attributed to  
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discrimination. This discrimination can take various forms. First, employers simply pay 
lower wages to women regardless of their performance on the job. Second, female 
employees have fewer opportunities for promotion, irrespective of job satisfaction, 
which in turn leads to women being paid a lower wage rate. These empirical results 
indicate that policy efforts should be directed to reducing within-sector wage gap 
through labour regulations that guarantee equal pay and equal opportunity. 
Less than 7 per cent of total gender wage differences are inter-sectoral, of which 88.99 
per cent can be attributed to discrimination. Although the absolute magnitude is not 
significant, sectoral barriers do prevent women from entering certain sectors that have a 
stronger gender monopoly. In their decomposition of wage differential components by 
sector and region, Cai, Du and Wang (2005) find that the sectoral contribution in total 
wage differentials has shown an increase relative to the regional contribution, which 
implies the existence of sectoral monopoly. Therefore, eliminating the discrimination 
against women in entering certain sectors can be achieved through labour market 
development and entry barriers reduction. 
About 6.65 per cent of intra-sectoral wage differentials and 11.01 per cent of inter-
sectoral wage gap are caused by disparities in human capital endowment between men 
and women, while 6.95 per cent of the overall attribution of gender wage differentials 
can be explained by human capital and other individual characteristics. For urban 
workers, no difference is observed between men and women in education and health; in 
fact, the share of female workers participating in job training is 2.85 percentage points 
higher than that for male workers. But there is still one factor of concern. Urban 
unemployment has become severe since the late 1990s, and employment is undergoing a 
process of informalization, which induces urban poverty. A previous study finds that as 
educational levels increase, the enrolment gap between boys and girls widens, and can 
be very big at the higher education levels; i.e., male enrolment is 100 per cent higher 
than female (Cai and Wang 2001). This gap reflects the Chinese families’ preference of 
educational investment for boys rather than girls. When households face budget 
constraints, they tend to cut expenses with regard to girls’ education. Therefore, paying 
attention to this fact, and perhaps even intervention in an appropriate way, is necessary 
to prevent gender discrimination in the labour market. 
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